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1. Introduction 
In recent years, Labour fell out of love with the state. It’s time it rekindled the romance. 
Much of the Labour critique of state-based solutions can be attributed to a mixture of 
misplaced under-confidence, and the occasional unwarranted veer from plausible premises 
to mistaken conclusions. Whilst the shortcomings of distant bureaucracies and purely 
‘transactional’ politics are well-understood, the remedy to these problems is not ‘post-
statist’ solutions, but a more nuanced understanding of when and how the power of the 
state can be wielded in order to create a more egalitarian society, and where a big state 
can act as the guarantor of a free society of equals rather than a barrier to achieving it.  
Much of Labour’s public policy thinking between during 2010-15 was addressed to the 
puzzle of what social democracy could look like “when there’s no money left”, and of 
what a centre-left programme might be that made at least a partial peace with austerity. 
We are in different territory now, as the economic aftershocks of the Brexit earthquake 
will continue to be felt, and facing a Tory government that has abandoned Osborne’s fiscal 
target. The phantom policy constraints of the faulty consensus on austerity are consigned 
to the past, and now all wings of the party -- Labour’s moderates on its right and centre as 
much as its resurgent left – need to do serious thinking about the aims and scope of a new 
politics of a large, active state. The left needs to embrace the need for a new kind of 
statist social democracy, one sufficient to the challenges of rescuing a precarious 
economy, and addressing the almost overwhelming challenges of creating a more equal 
society.   
Blue Labour tried to convince people on the political left to see extensive state provision 
of goods and services as overly bureaucratic and an anachronistic reminder of Labour’s 
statist past. The Tories, naturally, took this story even further, advocating the big society 
with a small state in which even the socially disadvantaged would benefit from market-
style private provision of essential goods and services. However, the big society and a 
small state is the wrong way to go. The answer of how to create a just society is to have a 
big state: a state that ensures none are dominated, marginalised or oppressed, and one 
that expresses respect for its citizens through providing them with high-quality benefits, 
goods and services on a footing of equality. It is time again for people on the Left to 
reclaim the state and to proclaim unashamedly, and with vigour and confidence, the need 
for a big state. 
The need for a big state is something that can be derived from both empirical research on 
the failures of private provision where there is only a small state in the background, and 
from recent developments in normative political theory, which explore the social and 
political preconditions for creating a society of equals. Our aim here is first to describe 
the philosophical ideal of social equality, which we take as our starting point. Second, we 
show that the state plays an essential role in ensuring that citizens stand in relations of 
social equality, examining the examples of housing, working conditions, and childcare. In 
these cases, then, theory and practice agree and lead us to adopt the same conclusion, 
namely, that the left should re-embrace the idea of a big state, suitably directed, as the 
indispensable basis on which a society of social equality can be built.  
2. Social equality 
There is growing support for an account of justice as a matter of having the right kinds of 
relationships rather than only the right distribution of goods.  Where classical 1
egalitarianism wants people to have equal amounts of goods, in order for a society to 
count as just, social egalitarians want all members of society to be free and equal 
citizens. So what does this mean? Social equality advocates the elimination of 
relationships of domination, where some have arbitrary power over others, and 
oppression, where some are marginalised and face socially imposed limits, which others do 
not face, to what they can do or achieve.  Instead, we should create a society where we 2
all relate to each other as equals and none are regarded as having lesser status because of 
features such as race, class, gender, or sexuality, among others. Moreover, a commitment 
to social equality involves opposition to those large social inequalities in wealth and power 
which effectively render some second class citizens, while others are (and feel) virtually 
untouchable. 
This way of thinking about justice suggests that the state has an important role to play 
that cannot be replaced by private or voluntary provision. When a state provides citizens 
with goods, benefits or services, this can protect people from domination; that provision 
can ensure citizens have reasonable alternatives, so that they are not vulnerable to the 
arbitrary exercise of power by another. So, too, the state can undermine oppression either 
by providing opportunities for the socially disadvantaged, or by seeking to remove barriers 
that leave some marginalised or systematically disadvantaged. Similarly, the state can 
protect its citizens by making sure that nobody falls through the system’s cracks in times 
of temporary vulnerability and need, for instance, through universal social insurance or 
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state funded healthcare and/or a freely available, well-funded, public health system 
(which respects the people working in the service). 
Moreover, one other key insight that we can draw from the social egalitarian framework is 
that when the state acts, we should consider the expressive role that it plays. When goods 
and services are provided to citizens, that can be done in a way that expresses respect or 
in a way that expresses disrespect.  For a society of equals it is absolutely crucial that the 3
institutions of the state, which are after all there to protect everybody and to serve the 
common good, express respect and serve the fundamental interests of all citizens. In what 
follows, we shall take a look at a series of policy areas with the help of which we 
demonstrate this central role for a state – and, indeed, for a big state – in securing social 
equality between citizens.  
3. Housing 
We begin our social egalitarian case for increasing state intervention with the case of 
housing. In the UK, a growing number of people and families live in private rented 
accommodation: the number of households renting privately doubled over the last 16 
years, while the number of social renters decreased stayed almost constant.  Moreover, 4
growth in the stock of privately rented accommodation is more than five times higher than 
the growth in social housing provision.  . A social egalitarian perspective provides reasons 5
to be concerned about this shift away from social housing and owner-occupation towards 
private renting. The social relationship between landlord and tenant is troubling owing to 
the asymmetry in what is at stake for each party. For the renter, this is their home, the 
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spatial centre of their lives. For the landlord, this is a route to making money. So, too, 
renters are left vulnerable to intrusions into their space, with landlords determining what 
uses can be made of their space, such as whether they are permitted to hang pictures or 
keep pets. The stability of their home, as well as their ability to afford to continue living 
there, is dependent on the whims of the landlord, who can insist on six month rolling 
contracts and is permitted to increase rents at will each time. 
The shift towards more private renting has been encouraged by state policy.  But 6
increasing state intervention could put an end to the socially inegalitarian effects of the 
shift within the housing market. There are two forms state intervention could take.  One is 
promoting home ownership or building more social housing to try to stem the growth of 
the private rental market. This strategy might be supplemented by policies to make buy-
to-let mortgages less attractive. The other option is to increase its regulation of the 
private rental market. Here, Germany offers a promising model, as it caps the maximum 
increase in rent over a certain period of time. While the Mietpreisbremse as it is known in 
German (literally: rent brake) could be improved in how it is set and implemented in 
practice, it nevertheless represents an extremely promising line of approach within 
housing policy. Moreover, German tenants’ law is much more progressive than its 
comparable UK counterpart, protecting security of tenancy for long-time tenants and the 
right to privacy (especially as a protection against intrusive landlords).  
However, even a cap on rents and better rent contracts may leave the asymmetrical 
relationship between tenant and landlord largely unchanged. That might support the first 
policy option, of promoting home ownership and build more social housing. One of the key 
arguments here is that the current system is inefficient and counterintuitive. As it stands, 
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housing benefit, the state’s key existing policy tool, which is intended as state support for 
the socially vulnerable, turns into a free subsidy for the landlords, to whom these benefits 
are passed. Providing more affordable social housing might also have the benefit of 
slowing the increase of prices in the rental and property market. In a society of equals, 
nobody should depend on the mercy of private landlords in order to be able to live in a 
decent home, and property ownership should not be a mark of deep social distinction. A 
society and its state can express its respect for every member of society by giving 
everybody access to a decent and affordable home. The achievement of this goal, starting 
from the position of the current, deeply dysfunctional British housing market, will not be 
achieved anything less than comprehensive and vigorous state action. 
4. Work and Industrial Policy 
Another area in which social egalitarian insights point us in the direction of embracing a 
bigger state is work, in particular the casualization of wage labour relationships. With the 
rise of zero hour contracts in the past 10 years, we find ourselves in a situation in which in 
2011 61% of domiciliary care workers in England were employed on zero hour contracts, 
while 38% of employers in education and 29% of employers in health care used zero-hour 
contracts.   The problem with zero-hour contracts is obviously the asymmetry in 7
bargaining power that underlies most cases: while the employer takes close to no risk 
offering a zero hour contract to one of many highly qualified job seekers, the job seeker is 
in desperate need of a stable income. In the current economic climate, a zero-hour 
contract is often the only chance people have of employment, so despite the inherent 
precariousness and insecurity that comes with these contracts, many job seekers simply 
cannot refuse the offer.  
A society, which, despite being very affluent by global standards, provides its young 
citizens with insufficient opportunity to find long-term, stable, and reasonably fulfilling 
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employment fails these citizens. It is no use churning out university graduates in ever 
higher numbers, and carrying ever-higher levels of personal debt, if the state does not 
also play an active role in providing them with opportunities to leave precariousness 
behind. One relatively modest way of doing this is to set up partnerships between state 
education and enterprises to make specialised job training available, on a continuous 
basis, over the course of people’s lives. 
In times of crisis and deep structural change, the state needs to become more active still, 
in terms of directing investment and engaging in at least some macroeconomic planning, 
especially in the field of industrial policy. As Tony Atkinson has recently argued in his book 
Inequality: What Can Be Done?, inattention to the social and distributive dimensions of 
industrial policy have been a besetting failure of the British state in recent decades, and a 
more egalitarian society will require a rediscovery of a different tradition of industrial 
policy, that embraces the social imperative of a more activist industrial policy.   8
Compare the way in which the North of England has been left to fend for itself after the 
decline and destruction of the coal industry to the way change has been managed in the 
Ruhr area in Germany, where a regional development plan (the “Entwicklungsprogramm 
Ruhr”) focusing on education, new services and industries was set up as early as 1968, 
with the help of federal funding. While the Ruhr area still lags somewhat behind the more 
productive and affluent high-tech regions of southern Germany, the plan did save it from 
the kind of avoidable destitution and hopelessness from which the North of England (and 
the South Wales valleys) took so long to recover. A big state managing structural change 
(Strukturwandel, as the Germans term it) and providing its citizens with opportunities to 
escape unemployment, marginal employment and precariousness takes its responsibility 
for their lifetime prospects seriously. It does not do so by regarding them as passive 
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victims dependent on continuous assistance, but expresses respect by actively providing 
them with secure opportunities to make something out of their lives, and of living as 
active economic agents under conditions of greater social equality. This state 
responsibility is especially significant at times of rapidly changing macroeconomic 
circumstances, just as we saw with the deindustrialisation of the 1980s, and as we are 
seeing again now as the fast pace of technological change is rapidly restructuring the 
labour market. 
5. Public provision of childcare 
Our third example takes the case of childcare provision. Creating a society that does 
better in terms of equality between men and women is a constitutive necessity for 
realising relationships of social equality. Yet, while gender equality can sometimes be seen 
as a matter primarily of social norms and relationships, conceived somehow as separate 
from the bounds of state policy, there is an indispensable institutional element to the 
realisation of gender equality. Moreover, social norms often follow rather than leading 
changes in material levels of inequality between men and women. There is no coincidence 
at all that the countries that do best for gender equality and the place of women in 
politics and society – such as Sweden, Denmark and Iceland –  are also those that do best 
in terms of women’s participation in the workplace, and that this greater workplace 
participation is itself a consequences of an activist state that provides a ‘public option’ in 
childcare, making high quality care a universal entitlement of citizenship, rather than just 
another good to be purchased in the market. 
The privatised, ‘demand side’ to childcare that has been pursued by successive UK 
governments, through the creation and expansion of the childcare voucher system, has all 
the failings of the housing benefit system. Instead of guaranteeing quality in provision, or 
driving up the pay and prestige of nursery workers, this state subsidy has all-too-often 
simply worked its way rapidly through the system, ending up in the pockets of rent-
seeking ‘entrepreneurs’, while nursery workers remain underpaid and undervalued, and 
provision remains geographically patchy and in places simply unaffordable. The Labour 
government’s investment in SureStart pointed the way towards a more ambitious approach 
to social investment in pre-school children; a comprehensive, well-funded and systematic 
expansion of the ‘public option’ for childcare should be a central plank of an ambitious 
social democratic programme.  It would be good for gender equality, good for reducing 9
class inequalities between children, and a good route towards providing greater rewards 
and recognition for one of the most important occupations within society. But none of 
these enormous potential gains for social equality will be won without the action of a 
strong and powerful state.  
6. Conclusion 
If you care about the quality of social relationships and if you are serious about how we 
might create a free society of equals, then you have to want more state intervention. 
Such intervention can take the form of direct provision of goods and services, regulation 
to protect individuals from vulnerability, and active investment and industrial policy. The 
most common argument against a ‘big state’ approach – that we can’t afford it, or that it 
crowds-out the virtues of provision through civil society – are both strikingly specious, to a 
degree that is not often well understood. The short era where serious people on the left 
gave excessive credence to these specious objections to the big state should now be 
consigned firmly to the past. 
So, wouldn’t it then simply be too expensive to back this return of the big state? Far from 
it. The reality is that the state already heavily subsidises private activity in the policy 
areas we have discussed. Subsidies are not only expensive, but also, as seen, inefficient 
and in providing them the state may often fail to express respect for its citizens or to 
protect their equal standing. Too often, in the absence of the structural intervention we 
endorse, subsidies just run through the system like water through sand, finding their way 
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into the pockets of those who are already advantaged by the system, rather than those 
who need to be supported. The kind of direct investment we propose would be much 
cheaper in the medium to long-term. 
Another common argument against the big state, popular amongst proponents of the ‘big 
society’, as well as among some communitarian political philosophers, is that it crowds 
out voluntary activity by citizens within the sphere of civil society. Such activity is 
regarded as essential to a lively and democratic society, as it develops and maintains trust 
between citizens, and creates ‘social capital’. It is clear, we grant, that such relationships 
must be of the highest importance for social egalitarians. However, these objections to 
state provision are poorly supported by empirical research. Studies have consistently 
found that the level of civil society activity in countries with big states – especially the 
Scandinavian ones – is by no means inferior to that found in countries with smaller states, 
such as the UK, or the US.  It seems that if the state covers the provision of the most 10
basic and important goods well, then empowered and motivated citizens simply find 
themselves something else to do. If, on the other hand, provision of essential goods is left 
to voluntary organisations, such as churches and charities, then citizens may find 
themselves at the mercy of their discretion.  11
  
Egalitarians are right to think that the concern with equality should be a concern with the 
quality of relationships, and not just a concern with the distribution of goods.  But the 12
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move from this important realisation to scepticism about the state is dangerous and 
unwarranted. State provision is about creating the preconditions for relationships of 
equality, not just about transfers of resources. A powerful, big state which is democratic in 
its procedures and fosters a culture of institutional respect for all its citizens can be close 
to its citizens and empower them to live lives without domination or oppression. In short: 
if you care about social equality, you want a big state.
